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Abstract.  In this paper we present the key aspects regarding 
central bank’s independence. Most economists consider that the factor 
which positively influences the efficiency of monetary policy measures is 
the high independence of the central bank. We determined that the 
National Bank of Romania (NBR) has a high degree of independence. 
NBR has both goal and instrument independence. We also consider that 
the hike of NBR’s independence played an important role in the 
significant disinflation process, as headline inflation dropped inside the 
targeted band of 3%  1 percentage point recently. 
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Introduction 
 
Government control on the central bank generally reduces the efficiency 
of monetary policy measures. In 1970s, the industrialized countries faced high 
inflation and output volatility to a certain extent due to fiscal domination. 
Therefore, the authorities in the developed countries gradually increased central 
bank independence in order to increase the impact of monetary policy 
measures. Between the mid 1980s and 2006, inflation and output smoothened in 
many developed countries, determining specialists to name this period “The 
Great Moderation”. According to Bernanke (2004), “The Great Moderation” is 
the result of three important factors: 1) structural changes, 2) better 
macroeconomic policies and 3) good luck. Consequently, the changes of 
economic institutions, technology and business practices enhanced economies’ 
ability to deal with multiple shocks. As regarding macroeconomic policies, 
certain economists agree that the high inflation and output volatility in the 
1970s was partly driven by inadequate monetary policies (Romer, Romer, 
2002). After mid-1980s, higher central bank independence (CBI), as well as the 
increased ability of the monetary authority to better quantify the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism enhanced the efficiency of monetary policy 
measures. CBI is also an important institutional requirement for adopting 
inflation targeting (IT). In conclusion, we consider that increased central bank 
independence is compatible to modern monetary policy. In this paper, we 
present the main issues regarding central bank independence. We also calculate 
NBR independence considering certain factors presented in previous research 
papers. 
 
1.   Short history of central banks 
 
The first central banks were created in Sweden and England and their 
main task was to finance the budget deficits. The frequent and severe financial 
crisis, as well as the lack of regulation of the banking system determined the 
authorities to extend central banks’ objectives in the developed countries. After 
the two World Wars, central banks dealt with high inflation and unemployment 
and low output especially in the countries severely affected by the military 
conflicts. Certain specialists realized that there could be trade offs between 
certain goals established for the central bank, as the monetary authority can not 
maintain price stability, high economic growths, low unemployment, external 
equilibrium and a stable exchange rate at the same time. In the 1960s, Friedman 
stated that the central banks can only influence in the long-run the inflation, the 
money supply and the exchange rate. Therefore, central banks focused on three Central Bank independence  
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main monetary policy strategies. In the last several decades, specialists realized 
that the institutional framework can also influence the efficiency of monetary 
policy measures.  
 
2.   Central bank independence 
 
Central bank independence problem is not new in the academic literature, 
as in the early nineteenth century Ricardo emphasized the fact the central banks 
must not directly finance the public deficit. In 1913, Keynes stated the same 
thing in his speech at the inauguration of the Reserve Bank of India. Posen 
(1995) considers that the interests of the political parties determine the degree 
of the central bank independence, as it can affect the inflation in the long-run. 
Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) believe that central bank 
independence in the industrialized countries is inversely correlated with the 
annualized inflation rate. A higher degree of central bank independence reduces 
disinflation costs (Debelle, Fischer, 1994, Walsh, 1995, 2003). Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti (1992) quantify CBI considering the following factors: 1) 
the manner central bank governor is appointed, 2) the relation between the 
central bank and the government and 3) central bank goal. According to 
previous research papers, there are three types of central bank independence: 1) 
goal independence, 2) instrument independence, 3) both. In Canada and New 
Zeeland, the central bank governor and the ministry of public finance establish 
the long-term goals of the central bank, while NBR has total independence in 
implementing the necessary instruments in order to achieve the stated goals. 
Therefore, Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zeeland have 
instrument independence but not goal independence while NBR has both goal 
and instrument independence as the governor establishes both the inflation 
target and the necessary instruments. Central bank independence is stipulated in 
special laws (in Romania, Law no. 312/2004). Despite special laws that guard 
CBI, in certain countries there are customs that prevail. An example is 
Argentina. Although the governors’ mandate stipulated by the law is of four 
years, governors usually resign when a new minister of finance is appointed.  
 
3.   NBR’s independence 
 
In this paper, we determine NBR’s degree of independence using a simple 
methodology. We construct an indicator that incorporates the following factors: 
1) NBR governor, 2) NBR actions, 3) NBR Board. The factors are similar to the 
ones used by Cukierman (1992) in constructing the Legal Variables Aggregate Vasile Dedu, Tiberiu Stoica 
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Unweighted (LVAU) indicator. We give a score for each criterion. The 
indicator is presented bellow.  
 
0 – there is no central bank independence considering that criterion 
1 – total central bank independence considering the criterion 
 
I. NBR Governor 
1.  NBR’s Governor mandate 
1. over 8 years  1 
0.50 
2. [6,8) years  0.75 
3. 5 years  0.50 
4. 4 years  0.25 
5. <4 years  0 
2. 
NBR Governor is appointed by 
a. NBR Board  1 
0.50 
b. NBR Board, Parliament and Government   0.75 
 
c. Parliament  0.50 
d. Government  0.25 
e. Prime Minister/Ministry of Public Finance or both  0 
3. 
The law permits NBR Governor to held other public positions 
a. No  1 
1  b. Only if the Government approves  0.50 
c. Yes  0 
4. 
NBR Governor could be revoked 
a. Only for reasons that are not political or he is unable to continue his work  1 
0.60 
b. NBR Board  0.80 
c. Parliament only for thorough reasons  0.60 
d. Parliament   0.40 
e. Government only for thorough reasons  0.20 
f. Government  0 
II. NBR Actions 
5. 
NBR can purchase government bonds or T-Bills from the primary market 
a. The law does not allow  1 
1 
b. The law allows  0 
6. 
NBR is also a development bank for the public and private sectors 
a. No  1 
1 
b. To a certain extent  0.66 
c. Yes  0.33 
d. It is NBR’s main task 0  
7. 
NBR budget is established by  
a. NBR  1 
1  b. NBR, Government and Parliament  0.50 
c. Government and Parliament Commissions  0 
8. 
NBR profit is distributed to 
a. According to NBR Act  1 
1  b. NBR  0.5 
c. Government   0 
9. 
NBR loans have maturities of 
a. 6 months and less  1 
1 
b. One year  0.66 
c. More than one year  0.33 
d. It is not stipulated  0.25 
10. 
NBR may grant short-term loans to the State Treasury. The maximum loan value is 
a. A nominal value  1  0.66 Central Bank independence  
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b. Established as a percentage of NBR’s capital   0.66 
c. Established as a percentage of total public revenues  0.33 
d. Established as a percentage of total public expenses  0 
11. 
NBR’s interest rate for the short-term loans granted to the State Treasury is: 
a. A market interest rate  1  1 
b. It is not allowed to be bellow a certain value  0.75 
c. It is not allowed to be above a certain value  0.50 
d. It is not stipulated  0.25 
c. Zero  0 
12. 
If there is a conflict between NBR and the Government 
a. NBR decides  1  0.50 
b. The law does not stipulate   0.5 
c. Government decides  0 
13. 
The inflation target is established by 
a. NBR  1 
1  b. NBR, Ministry of Public Finance or other institutions  0.5 
c. Other institutions with the exception of NBR  0 
14. 
The monetary policy rate is established only by NBR 
a. Yes  1 
1 
b. No  0 
15. 
NBR can grant loans to other public institutions 
a. No  1 
1 
b. Yes  0 
III. NBR Board 
16. 
NBR Board members are appointed by 
a. Parliament  1 
1 
b. Government   0 
17. 
The mandate of NBR’s Board members is higher than Government mandate 
a. Yes  1 
1 
b. No  0 
18. 
NBR Board members are allowed to have other public positions 
a. No  1 
1 
b. Yes  0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The maximum degree of independence = 18 
NBR’s degree of independence = 15.76 
NBR’s index of independence = 15.76/18 = 0.8755 (87.55 %) 
 
According to our indicator, NBR has a high degree of independence. We 
consider that the adoption of the Law no. 312/2004 regarding the Statute of the 
National Bank of Romania significantly increased the CBI. We also consider 
that the hike of NBR’s independence played an important role in the 
disinflation process, as headline inflation dropped inside the targeted band of  
3%  1 percentage point in the first part of 2012. NBR has both goal and 
instrument independence according to NBR’s Statute. Further research should 
focus on comparing the degree of independence of the monetary authorities in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
The main disadvantage of the presented approach is that we attributed 
equal weights to each criterion introduced and this could negatively affect the 
final results. Determining optimal weights could be a very difficult task. Vasile Dedu, Tiberiu Stoica 
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Another disadvantage is that the indicator offers a static view regarding the CBI 
and does not present how central bank independence changed in the past twenty 
years. We are aware of the fact that Law no. 312/2004 increased the CBI but we 
do not have figures indicating this process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present the key aspects regarding central bank’s 
independence. Most economists consider that the factor which positively 
influences the efficiency of monetary policy measures is the high independence 
of the central bank. We determined that NBR has a high degree of 
independence. According to our calculations, NBR has a degree of 
independence of 87.55 %. The Romanian monetary authority has both goal and 
instrument independence. We also consider that the hike of NBR’s 
independence played an important role in the significant disinflation process, as 
headline inflation dropped inside the targeted band of 3 % +/- 1 percentage 
point in the first part of 2012.  
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